The empirical-transcendental debate in philosophy of technology, as debates go, took a turn toward the counterposing of the two perspectives, ‘empirical’-pragmatic-pragmatist versus ‘transcendental’-critical. Postphenomenology aligns itself with the former standpoint, and it is in this spirit that commentators have criticized it for its too-instrumentalist stance and lack of overarching, i.e., transcendental orientation. But the positions may have become too starkly delineated in order for the debate to reach any breakthrough: a seemingly unbridgeable gap yawns between the stances of ‘technology with (...) a small “t”’ and ‘Technology with a capital “T.”' Is there any way to reorient the debate? In this paper I propose to do so by considering whether there would be some way of arriving from one end of the spectrum to the other—crossing the gap. Exploring the purported wasteland in between “technology” and “Technology” by way of object-oriented ontology (OOO)—Harman, Morton—we can find it actually filled with countless gaps, adhering to every thing. Following the radical insights of OOO, we’d have to attest to a ‘thing-transcendentality.’ The ‘gap,’ then, that seemed so threatening and all-encompassing, becomes smeared out, levelled down to a multiplicity of perspectives. And this casts the debate, with its purported strict tension between ‘empirical’ and ‘transcendental’ positions, in fresh terms, opening up new ways for studying how the two interrelate. (shrink)

In this article we seek to lay bare a couple of potential conceptual and methodological issues that, we believe, are implicitly present in contemporary philosophy of technology. At stake are the sustained pertinence of and need for coping strategies as to ‘how to live with technology ’ notwithstanding PhilTech’s advancement in its non-essentialist analysis of ‘technology’ as such; the issue of whether ‘living with technology’ is a technological affair or not ; and the tightly related question concerning the status of (...) the methodological bedrock of contemporary PhilTech, the ‘empirical turn.’ These matters are approached from the perspective of the philosophical notion of the ‘art of living,’ and our argumentation is developed both as a context for and on the basis of the contributions to the special issue ‘The Art of Living with Technology.’. (shrink)

Laying the groundwork -- Bateson and technology -- The art of living with technology.

This book provides an introduction to postphenomenology, an emerging school of thought in the philosophy of technology and science and technology studies, which addresses the relationships users develop with the devices they use.

This paper zooms in on a recent development in the discussion between postphenomenology and critical constructivism: the attempt at working out a political philosophy in the framework of postphenomenology, specifically Peter-Paul Verbeek’s. Verbeek contrasts mediation theory to critical theory, arguing that critical theorists only “talk”; they don’t “do.” While the latter reproach postphenomenology/mediation theory for its lack of politics, Verbeek actually poses that “real” politics cannot be done by critical theorists—indeed exactly because of their not doing, that is, doing in (...) the sense of helping to design and develop good real-world technological solutions. But this brings up pertinent questions, about whether a theory should “do” something, what that means, and whether calls for “doing” do not carry their own presuppositions with them that, if not made explicit, will bias the theory and its “use” toward certain directions. These issues are explored by way of among others an excursion into Rortyan pragmatism. Eventually, I conclude, it is perfectly acceptable that critical constructivism should “talk” and postphenomenology “do”—as long as we keep the meanings of those terms sufficiently clear. (shrink)

Postphenomenology and Media: Essays on Human–Media–World Relations explores our contemporary media landscape from the unique perspective of postphenomenology. This volume for the first time puts the central concepts of postphenomenology to work for the specific analysis of new, digital media—thus delivering a wholly innovative take on their study.

In response to Peter–Paul Verbeek’s and Paul Levinson’s reviews of my article ‘In Between Us,’ I comment on four criticisms. Firstly, my approach of ‘mediation as such’ does not endorse the view of mediation as secondary to mediata (i.e., entities), but does not exclude it either. Secondly, my concepts of “transparency of use” and of “context” are to be seen as philosophical ‘tools’ and not as mutually exclusive states. Thirdly, I agree with Levinson that technologies do indeed remediate, and mostly (...) not for the worse. However, fourthly, at the same time we should always be on guard for their nefarious effects. (shrink)

Weiss, Propen, and Reid gather a diverse group of scholars to analyze the growing obsolescence of the human-object dichotomy in today's world. In doing so, Design, Mediation, and the Posthuman brings together diverse disciplines to foster a dialog on significant technological issues pertinent to philosophy, rhetoric, aesthetics, and science.

Responding to the commentaries by Corey Anton and Ian Angus, I outline anew, and so seek to further clarify, the starting points of and motivations behind my reflection about the concrete-abstract distinction and the ways in which this plays out in technology use, seen from an epistemological standpoint. My eventual purpose is to begin to develop, on the basis of the conceptual exercise, guidelines for an emancipatory ‘art of living with technology,’ that circles around the attempt to think beyond the (...) immediate concrete, into the direction of the ‘abstract conditions’ shaping that ‘concrete.’. (shrink)

As we become more and more involved with digital technologies on a daily basis, we are in need of a model to make sense of what we do with and “in” them. Here we analyze the use of digital media by way of a collecting paradigm, since our online activities – centered on selecting, accumulating, organizing, and showing – strongly resemble the practice of collectors. In the first part of the paper, we outline the main traits of collecting practices, and (...) discuss relevant online practices in the light of these traits, thereby tracing the contours of an online “collecting culture.” In the second part, we list the possible underlying causes and motivations for collecting, and investigate how far these explanations also apply to online activity, so offering a preliminary framework for the further study of online practices. (shrink)

As we become more and more involved with digital technologies on a daily basis, we are in need of a model to make sense of what we do with and “in” them. Here we analyze the use of digital media by way of a collecting paradigm, since our online activities – centered on selecting, accumulating, organizing, and showing – strongly resemble the practice of collectors. In the first part of the paper, we outline the main traits of collecting practices, and (...) discuss relevant online practices in the light of these traits, thereby tracing the contours of an online “collecting culture.” In the second part, we list the possible underlying causes and motivations for collecting, and investigate how far these explanations also apply to online activity, so offering a preliminary framework for the further study of online practices. (shrink)

This essay takes an epistemological perspective on the question of the ‘art of living with technology.’ Such an approach is needed as our everyday notion and understanding of technology keep being framed in the old categories of instrumentalism and essentialism—notwithstanding philosophy of technology’s substantial attempts, in recent times, to bridge the stark dichotomy between those two viewpoints. Here, the persistent dichotomous thinking still characterizing our everyday involvement with technology is traced back to the epistemological distinction between ‘concrete’ and ‘abstract.’ Those (...) terms are often contrasted, and a tendency can be found, in the literature as well as in popular discourse, to either conceptually favor one of both or let them collapse into each other. The current essay makes a plea, in an exploratory manner, and on the basis of insights hailing from among others Gregory Bateson and Alfred Korzybski, to not choose either one of those options, but to practice ourselves in navigating ladders of abstraction. (shrink)

Het ethos waarin de mens leeft en handelt is in verandering zolang de mens leeft en handelt. In De maakbare moraal reflecteren verschillende filosofen over de antwoorden die het moderne en hedendaagse denken kunnen bieden op vragen die net door dat veranderend ethos tot stand worden gebracht. De idee dat moraal 'maakbaar' zou zijn houdt meteen ook een kritisch standpunt in: wat precies is er in onze morele omgang met elkaar dat beheersbaar, expliciteerbaar, voorstelbaar... zou kunnen zijn? De maakbare moraal (...) bundelt bijdragen van Daniel Acke, Hans Alma, Sonja Lavaert, Julia Maria Mönig, Johan Stuy en Adelheid Rigo, Marc Van den Bossche, Yoni Van Den Eede, Karl Verstrynge en Else Walravens. De reeks Humanismen wil het denken over de hedendaagse condition humaine op een prikkelende en eigenzinnige manier stimuleren. Het begrip humanisme krijgt hier een zeer ruime omschrijving: respect voor de mens in zijn diversiteit en pluraliteit en voor de manier waarop individuen zoeken naar identiteit en zingeving. De reeks komt tot stand onder begeleiding van prof. dr. Marc Van den Bossche van de vakgroep Wijsbegeerte en Moraalwetenschappen van de Vrije Universiteit Brussel. (shrink)

In this contribution I reply to Heather Wiltse and Róisín Lally’s commentaries. Both stress the importance of not only looking at gaps, but also accounting for relation and connection—an endeavor which was less visible in my original piece but which I wholly support, and on which I elaborate more here, making use of the example of ‘algorithmic mediation.’ In the process, I attempt to clear up some possible misunderstandings with regard to my initial formulations, as concerns object-oriented ontology’s stance on (...) relation, the question of whether postphenomenology already has a ‘transcendental’ account, the variety of possible connotations associated with the term ‘transcendental,’ and my proposals for looking specifically at what happens in between ‘small’ (‘technology with a small “t”’) and ‘big’ (‘Technology with a capital “T”’) perspectives. It turns out that my commentators and I are pretty much on a similar track—though we may differ in the first instance as to the conceptual instruments we would choose to deploy in that, nonetheless shared, project. (shrink)

In this paper I comment on the arguments put forth by Robert Rosenberger and Galit Wellner on the issue of using a mobile phone while driving a car, and I do this by way of a detour through the work of Kevin Kelly and Marshall McLuhan. While Rosenberger and Wellner focus first and foremost on the possibilities and impossibilities within the human organism, I seek to add to the debate the however experimental standpoint of the technologies “themselves.”.

In this paper I comment on the arguments put forth by Robert Rosenberger and Galit Wellner on the issue of using a mobile phone while driving a car, and I do this by way of a detour through the work of Kevin Kelly and Marshall McLuhan. While Rosenberger and Wellner focus first and foremost on the possibilities and impossibilities within the human organism, I seek to add to the debate the however experimental standpoint of the technologies “themselves.”.

Critical theory of technology (CTT) and postphenomenology (PostPhen) complement each other finely. Yet whereas CTT runs the risk of negating the interwovenness of humans and technology, a problem partly resolved by PostPhen, PostPhen itself threatens to neglect its very own base, i.e., the condition of technology and society being first and foremost human endeavors. This paper suggests not to decry these two approaches but to add a third component in order to compensate for their deficiencies. That third partner consists of (...) a new-fledged version of philosophical anthropology elaborated on the basis of the media theory of Marshall McLuhan. I am here mainly concerned with how such an approach can supplement CTT, which it does by offering an account of technological mediation that harbors not only a relational-ontological but also—in contrast with PostPhen—a substantivist-ontological aspect, and in addition a proper theory of technological blindness, much needed to make sense of perceptive biases and meaning-constituting activities in everyday life. I will illustrate these issues by way of what I dub ‘the Mailman Problem’: a sketch of a very mundane instance of “deworlding” that is, however, not perceived as such. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of technology features a sophisticated analysis of the ways by which social forces influence processes of technological design, production and use. While Feenberg is foremostly read as a critical theorist, this essay argues that his call to democratize technology stands on distinct phenomenological grounds. This is based on the way he illustrates the role of experience in subtending potentials for the progressive transformation of the sociotechnical sphere. Against this background, this essay identifies an important shift in (...) the way Feenberg articulates experience, from relating it to lifelong processes of learning and identity-construction (Bildung) to an emphasis on visceral immediacy (Erlebnis). This shift manifests a newfound focus on material, embodied meanings over-against linguistic ones, and results in a considerable tension between Feenberg’s appeal to experiential self-evidence and his critical position toward technology. The discussion of the two modes of experience exemplifies the current that underlies Feenberg’s work, namely the creation of traffic between ontological and ontic accounts of sociotechnical entities, practices and relations. (shrink)

In a world that is becoming more ‘networked’ than ever, especially on the personal-everyday level—with for example digital media pervading our lives and the Internet of Things now being on the rise—we need to increasingly account for ‘networked realities’. But are we as human beings actually well-equipped enough, epistemologically speaking, to do so? Multiple approaches within the philosophy of technology suggest our usage of technologies to be in the first instance oriented towards efficiency and the achievement of goals. We thereby (...) neglect the actual systemic, networked nature of technology, or its wider impacts. With regard to the pressing issue of how to cross the ‘gap’ between these two ‘modes,’ the paper at hand engages with the work of Gregory Bateson, reading him as a philosopher of technology. Bateson’s notions of “conscious purpose” and “learning” offer excellent tools to understand our predicament of living in a networked world but being partly unable to sufficiently grasp and come to terms with this situation. Moreover, as the article endeavors to demonstrate, Bateson’s thought is to be cast as a crucial addition to the body of theory being developed in the philosophy of technology. (shrink)

In his new book, Husserl’s Missing Technologies, Don Ihde provides yet another, and highly enriching, iteration of postphenomenology. My comments here concern a couple of observations that he makes along the way with regard to the “scientific” status of philosophy and the question of whether philosophies, like technologies, have “use-lifes.” These remarks actually pierce through to the core of the postphenomenological theoretical corpus. In particular, there are consequences for the concept of multistability that need to be discussed: Are some stabilities (...) better than others? In asking that question, which deserves the most emphasis: actuality or potentiality? And to what extent is there a continuity between “ideas” (i.e., theories) and technologies? (shrink)

In his new book, Husserl’s Missing Technologies, Don Ihde provides yet another, and highly enriching, iteration of postphenomenology. My comments here concern a couple of observations that he makes along the way with regard to the “scientific” status of philosophy and the question of whether philosophies, like technologies, have “use-lifes.” These remarks actually pierce through to the core of the postphenomenological theoretical corpus. In particular, there are consequences for the concept of multistability that need to be discussed: Are some stabilities (...) better than others? In asking that question, which deserves the most emphasis: actuality or potentiality? And to what extent is there a continuity between “ideas” (i.e., theories) and technologies? (shrink)

Is the World Wide Web (WWW) the true Citizens’ Medium? This issue has been ardently debated in recent years: some herald the WWW as an emancipating technological tool, others claim it to be just another ploy of capitalism. As empirical proof corroborating both sides proliferates, the correct answer must probably be situated somewhere at the intersection. Of this heterogenic ‘middle’ field the work of Michel de Certeau helps us to make sense. We take three de Certeauan concepts, sketched out as (...) binary pairs, and elaborate on them in relation to ‘Web 2.0’: strategy/tactics, passive/active, and writing/speech. Exactly the tension between the terms of these distinctions is played out on the Web. Yet boundaries do blur, and right there the contours of some hybrid ‘strategic tactics,’ performed by everyday users, are becoming visible. (shrink)

In recent years several approaches—philosophical, sociological, psychological—have been developed to come to grips with our profoundly technologically mediated world. However, notwithstanding the vast merit of each, they illuminate only certain aspects of technological mediation. This paper is a preliminary attempt at a philosophical reflection on technological mediation as such—deploying the concepts of ‘transparency’ and ‘opacity’ as heuristic instruments. Hence, we locate a ‘theory of transparency’ within several theoretical frameworks—respectively classic phenomenology, media theory, Actor Network Theory, postphenomenology, several ethnographical, psychological, and (...) sociological perspectives, and finally, the Critical Theory of Technology. Subsequently, we render a general, systematic overview of these theories, thereby conjecturing what a broad analysis of technological mediation in and of itself might look like—finding, at last, an essential contradiction between transparency of ‘use’ and transparency of social origins and effects. (shrink)

Diverging definitions of what the human being is or should be polarize the ongoing debate about human enhancement between so-called bioconservatives and transhumanists. This essay seeks to review some of the central issues at stake in this discussion and in a wider sense within current, mostly philosophically oriented approaches that endeavor to understand “human being” or “human nature” in relation to technology. It does so specifically on the basis of a discussion of two recent works that thoroughly grapple with these (...) topics. (shrink)

Experimentation in Technological Wisdom: Can the Political be Kept off the Practice Ground?Gert GoeminneCentre Leo Apostel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, BelgiumCentre for Sustainable Development, Ghent University, Belgiume-mail: [email protected] Welcome VoiceI met Michel Puech for the first time in 2008 at a workshop entitled ‘Artificial Environments.’ In an interdisciplinary Science and Technology Studies spirit, this 2-day event at Roskilde University gathered philosophers and sociologists of science and technology, as well as architecture theorists. Being rather new to the STS-field at that point, I (...) had read the main authors of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, including Andrew Pickering and Peter‐Paul Verbeek, who were present at the workshop. And sure, I had acquainted myself with the work of the French masters such as Bruno Latour, Gilbert Simondon and Bernard Stiegler. I had never heard of the French philosopher of technology Michel Puech, though. But there he was, startin .. (shrink)

What do Social Networking Sites (SNS) ‘do to us’: are they a damning threat or an emancipating force? Recent publications on the impact of “Web 2.0” proclaim very opposite evaluative positions. With the aim of finding a middle ground, this paper develops a pragmatist approach to SNS based on the work of Richard Rorty. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, we analyze SNS as conversational practices. Second, we outline, in the form of an imaginary conversation between Rorty and Heidegger, (...) a positive and negative ‘conversational’ view on SNS. Third, we deploy a reflection, again using Rortian notions, on that evaluation, starting from the concept of ‘self-reflectivity.’ Finally, the relations between these three steps are more detailedly investigated. By way of the sketched technique, we can interrelate the two opposing sides of the recent debates—hope and threat—and judge SNS in all their ambiguity. (shrink)